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Abstract—In this paper, we investigate a general nonlinear
model of opinion dynamics in which both state-dependent sus-
ceptibility to persuasion and antagonistic interactions are consid-
ered. According to the existing literature and socio-psychological
theories, we examine three specializations of state-dependent
susceptibility, that is, stubborn positives scenario, stubborn neu-
trals scenario, and stubborn extremists scenario. Interactions
among agents form a signed graph, in which positive and
negative edges represent friendly and antagonistic interactions,
respectively. Based on Perron-Frobenius property of eventually
positive matrices and LaSalle invariance principle, we conduct a
comprehensive theoretical analysis of the generalized nonlinear
opinion dynamics. We obtain some sufficient conditions such that
the states of all agents converge into the subspace spanned by the
right positive eigenvector of an eventually positive matrix. When
there exists at least one entry of the right positive eigenvector
which is not equal to one, the derived results can be used
to describe different levels of an opinion. Finally, we present
two examples to demonstrate the effectiveness of the theoretical
findings.
Index Terms—Opinion dynamics, state-dependent suscepti-
bility, signed graphs, eventually positive matrices, invariance
principle.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE study of opinion dynamics has attracted much atten-tion in recent years. Based on some social psychology
theories such as social comparison theory [1], cognitive dis-
sonance theory [2] and balance theory [3], [4], various math-
ematical models have been presented to model the evolution
of opinion forming [5]–[12]. Among these models, the basis
is DeGroot model [5], which is a discrete-time and weighted
averaging model. The corresponding continuous-time version
of DeGroot model was studied in [13]. The system matrix
of DeGroot model is the row-stochastic adjacency matrix
of an interaction graph, and cannot change with the states.
Moreover, DeGroot model cannot model social behavior of
stubborn agents, which is often hard to be affected by other
agents. In [6] DeGroot model, in which some agents’ states
are unchanged, was investigated.
To overcome the limitation of DeGroot model, Friedkin-
Johnsen model [7], [8] permits the agents to have different sus-
ceptibilities to persuasion. Although Friedkin-Johnsen model
can model the behavior of stubborn agents, the behavior of
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agents cannot change with time and do not depend on current
opinion or attitude. Various extensions of Friedkin-Johnsen
model have been considered in [9]–[12]. A typical opinion
model with state-dependent interactions is the bounded confi-
dence model [14]–[20]. This model assumes that two agents
can interact with each other when they are close enough. Some
special bounded confidence models have been studied in [21]–
[23].
Recently, Amelkin et al. [24] proposed a continuous-time
nonlinear model of polar opinion dynamics in which the
agents’ susceptibilities to persuasion depend on the agents’
current opinion or attitude at hand, and interactions among
agents are cooperative. According to different theories of so-
cial psychology, they investigated three specialized scenarios,
that is, stubborn extremists, stubborn positives and stubborn
neutrals. The scenario with stubborn extremists, based on
social-psychological references [25]–[27], assumes that the
extreme opinions are resistant to change and neutral opinions
will be attracted by extreme opinions, while the scenario with
stubborn positives, based on [8], is a special version of model
with stubborn extremists. The scenario with stubborn neutrals,
based on social comparison theory [1] and social norms [8],
supposes that the extreme opinions are more likely to change
than the neutral opinions. Using the non-smooth analysis tool,
they made a thorough theoretical analysis of the novel opinion
dynamics model in [24].
In this paper, we will study a generalized nonlinear opinion
dynamics which includes both state-dependent susceptibility
to persuasion and antagonistic interactions. Cooperative and
antagonistic interactions usually coexist in social networks
[28]–[30]. The signed graphs are often used to describe the
cooperative and antagonistic interactions in social networks,
with positive and negative edges denoting respectively the
cooperative and antagonistic interactions. In social networks,
the signed graphs are generally structurally balanced [3] in
the sense that all nodes of the graph can be divided into
two subsets, where the edges in each subset are positive and
the edges connecting the two subsets are negative. Based on
the balance theory [3], the bipartite consensus for structurally
balanced signed graphs has been investigated in [31]–[37].
Generally speaking, when the signed graph is structurally
balanced, the bipartite consensus problem can be transformed
to a classical consensus or synchronization problem. However,
when the signed graph is not structurally balanced, one should
not expect the network to achieve bipartite consensus. Instead,
the unanimity of opinion over a signed graph was studied in
[38] when the adjacency matrix satisfies the eventually positive
property [39]–[41].
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2Our introduced model can be seen as a generalization
of the opinion forming models in [24], [38]. Comparing
it with the model in [24], our model can deal with the
antagonistic interactions and accurately describe the degree
of agent’s opinion. For example, ten people voted for the
Green Party in an election, but they did not support it at the
same level. Hence, it is reasonable to use different positive or
negative values to differentiate the opinion of these electors.
Comparing it with the model in [38], our model introduces
state-dependent susceptibility to persuasion. This modification
makes the dynamics of our model become more complex than
the one in [38]. There also exist some unobservable behaviors
in the linear model in [38] (see Example 2 in Section IV for
details).
This paper considers three specializations of state-dependent
susceptibility which are drawn from [24]. We assume that all
eigenvalues of the coupled system matrix have non-positive
real parts, and the dominant eigenvalue is real and the cor-
responding eigenvector is a positive vector. We consider the
directed and undirected signed graphs, respectively. Two cases
about the adjacency matrix of a signed graph are examined: 1)
the adjacency matrix is eventually positive; 2) the adjacency
matrix is not eventually positive, but there exists a matrix
such that the adjacency matrix has Perron-Frobenius property
by adding it. When the dominant eigenvalue of the coupled
system matrix is zero, utilizing Perron-Frobenius property
of matrix with some negative entries and LaSalle invariance
principle, we obtain sufficient conditions such that the states
of the studied model will converge into the subspace spanned
by the right positive eigenvector of the adjacency matrix. On
the other hand, when the dominant eigenvalue of the coupled
system matrix is non-positive, we derive sufficient conditions
such that the general equilibrium points of the underlying
model are asymptotically stable.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II presents notations and the problem statement. Sec-
tion III undertakes a comprehensive theoretical analysis of
three specializations of state-dependent susceptibility, that is,
stubborn positives scenario, stubborn neutrals scenario, and
stubborn extremists scenario in generalized nonlinear opinion
dynamics. Section IV gives two numerical examples to verify
the obtained theoretical results. Finally, Section V summa-
rizes our conclusions and describes future work. Besides,
Appendix A provides some definitions and facts about signed
graphs and Appendix B states some results of eventually
positive matrices and Perron-Frobenius property, followed by
some lemmas about positive semidefinite matrices given in
Appendix C.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
Let 1 (0) be a vector of appropriate dimension with all
elements equal to 1(0). Let Rn+ := {x | x ≥ 0}, Rn− :=
{x | x ≤ 0}, and Rn−,+ := {x | x ≤ 0 or x ≥ 0},
where x = [x1 x2 · · · xn]T. sgn is the signum function.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, let diag(x) := diag{x1, x2, · · · , xn},
diag(x)2 := diag{x21, x22, · · · , x2n}, and ||x||∞ := maxi |xi|
which is the infinity norm of x. For vectors x, y ∈ Rn,
x < y if xi < yi, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. For a real square matrix
A = [aij ] ∈ Rn×n, A ≥ 0 if aij ≥ 0, and A > 0 if
aij > 0, i, j = 1, 2, · · · , n. If A ≥ 0 (> 0), then A is
called a nonnegative (positive) matrix. For a real symmetric
square matrix B, B  0 ( 0) means that B is positive
semidefinite (negative semidefinite), and B  0 (≺ 0) means
that B is positive definite (negative definite). I represents
an identity matrix of appropriate dimension. Let sp(A) =
{λ1(A), · · · , λn(A)} denote the spectrum of matrix A, and
max{λ1(A), · · · , λn(A)} denote the dominant eigenvalue of
matrix A, where λi(A), i = 1, · · · , n are the eigenvalues of A.
ρ(A) stands for the spectral radius of matrix A, which is the
smallest real positive number such that ρ(A) ≥ |λi(A)|,∀i =
1, · · · , n. Denote the transpose of matrix A by AT, and let
H(A) = 12 (A + A
T). A matrix A is irreducible if and only
if it cannot be transformed into a block upper-triangular form
by simultaneous row/column permutations.
B. Problem Statements
Consider a general model of opinion dynamics as follows:
x˙i = ai(xi)
(
− σixi +
N∑
j=1
bijxj
)
, i = 1, · · · , N, (1)
where xi(t) ∈ [−1, 1] is the agent state, ai(xi) ∈ [0, 1] is the
susceptibility function which is state-dependent and Lipschitz
in [−1, 1], and σi > 0 represents forgetting factors for the
ith agent. B = [bij ] ∈ RN×N is the adjacency matrix of
a strongly connected signed digraph G(B), where bii = 0,
bij > 0 indicates that agents i and j are friendly, and bij < 0
indicates that agents i and j are antagonistic.
Let x = [x1, · · · , xN ]T and Σ = diag{σ1, · · · , σN}. Then
the generalized opinion dynamics (1) can be written in matrix
form as
x˙ = A(x)Ex, (2)
where A(x) = diag{a1(x1), · · · , aN (xN )}, and E = B − Σ.
If there do not exist the susceptibility functions, then the
generalized opinion dynamics (2) becomes x˙ = Ex, which
was investigated in [38]. However, when there exist the
susceptibility functions ai(xi) ∈ [−1, 1], the dynamic behavior
of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) will become more
complex when compared to x˙ = Ex. If Σ = I and the
adjacency matrix B (bij ∈ {0, 1}) is row-stochastic, then
the generalized opinion dynamics (2) becomes the model (1)
considered in [24]. In [24], the dynamic behavior of its model
(1) was studied for some special susceptibility functions, that
is, stubborn positives scenario A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)),
stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x)2, and stubborn
extremists scenario A(x) = (I − diag(x)2).
Our model (2) can be viewed as a generalization of the
models considered in [24], [38]. In the next section, we
will study the dynamic behavior of the generalized opinion
dynamics (2) under three special scenarios, that is, stubborn
extremists, stubborn positives, and stubborn neutrals. In this
paper, we assume that matrix E is eventually positive and all
3eigenvalues have non-positive real parts. Precisely, we adopt
the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1: The adjacency matrix B is eventually posi-
tive, and σi = σj ≥ ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N .
Assumption 2: The adjacency matrix B is not eventually
positive, and E can be represented as E = C − dI , where
C = B+D is eventually positive, D = dI−Σ, and d ≥ ρ(C).
III. ANALYSIS OF GENERALIZED OPINION DYNAMICS
This section will study the dynamic behavior of the gen-
eralized opinion dynamics (2) under three special scenarios
(stubborn extremists, stubborn positives, and stubborn neu-
trals) respectively. Before moving forward, we first consider
equilibrium points of the generalized opinion dynamics (2).
All equilibrium points of the generalized opinion dynamics
(2) satisfy A(x)Ex = 0. Suppose that Ia,0 = {i | ai(xi) =
0}, Ia,+ = {i | ai(xi) > 0}. First, if Ia,0 = ∅, then all
ai(xi) > 0, i = 1, · · · , N , and all equilibrium points satisfy
Ex = 0. Second, if Ia,0 6= ∅ and Ia,+ 6= ∅, then there exists
a permutation matrix P such that
PA(x)PT =
[
A1(x) 0
0 A2(x)
]
, (3)
where A1(x) = 0, A2(x) > 0. Let
y = Px =
[
y1
y2
]
,
where dim y1 = |Ia,0|. Then
y˙ = Px˙ = PA(x)Ex
= PA(x)PTPEPTy
= PA(x)PTE¯y
=
[
0 0
0 A2(y2)
] [
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
] [
y1
y2
]
, (4)
where A2(y2) > 0. Hence, all equilibrium points of (4)
satisfy y∗1 ∈ {s | ai(s) = 0,∀i}|Ia,0|, E¯22y∗2 = −E¯21y∗1 .
In this case, all equilibrium points are x∗ = PTy∗. Third,
if Ia,+ = ∅, then all equilibrium points of the generalized
opinion dynamics (2) are x∗ ∈ {s | ai(s) = 0,∀i}N .
A. Stubborn Positives Scenario
This subsection focuses on the dynamic behavior of the
generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn positives
scenario, that is, A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)).
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2)
holds, G(B) is the signed digraph, and there exists a positive
diagonal matrix Γ = diag{γ1, · · · , γN} such that H(ΓE)  0
and rankH(ΓE) = rankE.
1) If x(0) < 1, then lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr, where vr is the right
positive eigenvector of B (C), α ∈ [− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ).
2) If Ia,0 6= ∅, Ia,+ 6= ∅, there exists a permutation matrix
P such that the network (2) has the form of (4), E¯22 is
nonsingular, and −1 ≤ −E¯−122 E¯211 < 1, then limt→∞x(t) =
x∗ for all x(0) ∈ {x | xi = 1, i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈ [−1, 1),∀i /∈
Ia,0}, where x∗ = PTy∗, and y∗ is the equilibrium point
of (4).
(1,1)
(-1,-1) (1,-1)
(-1,1)
0
P(ε) x1
x2
S(ε)
S0(ε)
Fig. 1. Convergence behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) with
stubborn positives in two dimensions. The blue solid line is spanned by the
right positive eigenvector vr and the red dotted line is spanned by vector 1.
3) If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1,
then every solution starting in {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈
[−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches βvr, where J = {j | vrj =
||vr||∞}, β = 1||vr||∞ .
Proof: First, we consider the case that Assumption 1
holds. The partition of the state space is illustrated in Fig. 1.
1) Because B is an eventually positive matrix, by Lemma 2,
we have that matrix B is irreducible, ρ(B) is a simple positive
eigenvalue of B and the corresponding right eigenvector vr is
positive. When Assumption 1 holds, σi = σj ≥ ρ(B),∀i, j =
1, · · · , N . If σi = ρ(B),∀i = 1, · · · , N , then all eigenvalues
of E = B − Σ have non-positive real parts. Moreover, 0 is a
simple eigenvalue of E with a right positive eigenvector vr. If
σi = σj > ρ(B),∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then all eigenvalues of E
have negative real parts, and its dominant eigenvalue has the
right positive eigenvector vr.
Let S(ε) = [−1, 1− ε]N , where 0 < ε < 2. Suppose that
V (x) =
N∑
i=1
γi [−2xi − 2 ln(1− xi)] . (5)
Then V (x) is positive definite in S(ε). For all x ∈ S(ε), the
time derivative of V (x) along (2) is given by
V˙ =
N∑
i=1
2γixi
x˙i
1− xi
=
N∑
i=1
xiγieix
= xTH(ΓE)x,
where ei is the ith row of matrix E. Since H(ΓE)  0, we
4have
V˙ =
N∑
i=1
xiγieix
= xTH(ΓE)x
≤ 0
for all x ∈ S(ε). Hence, S(ε) is positively invariant with
respect to (2). By Lemma 4, V˙ = 0 if and only if H(ΓE)x =
0. Because rankH(ΓE) = rankE, H(ΓE) and E have the
same null space. Thus, V˙ = 0 if and only if Ex = 0. If
σi = ρ(B),∀i = 1, · · · , N , then V˙ = 0 if and only if x ∈
P(ε) = {x ∣∣ x = αvr, α ∈ [ − 1||vr||∞ , 1−ε||vr||∞ ]}. If σi =
σj > ρ(B),∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then V˙ = 0 if and only if
x = 0. By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution of (2)
with initial condition x(0) ∈ S(ε) converges into P(ε). If
x(0) is sufficiently close to 1, then ε → 0. Therefore, for all
x(0) < 1, lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr, α ∈
[− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ).
2) Let SIa,0(ε) = {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈ [−1, 1 −
ε],∀i /∈ Ia,0}, where 0 < ε < 2. When x(0) ∈ SIa,0(ε),
the solution of (2) satisfies xi(t) ≡ 1,∀i ∈ Ia,0. P is a
permutation matrix such that
y = Px =
[
y1
y2
]
,
where y1 = 1,dim y1 = |Ia,0|. Then the network (2) becomes
y˙ =
[
0 0
0 0.5(I − diag(y2))
] [
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
] [
y1
y2
]
.
Hence,
y˙2 = 0.5(I − diag(y2))
(
E¯22y2 + E¯211
)
, (6)
where y2 ∈ [−1, 1− ε]|Ia,+|.
Since E¯22 is nonsingular, we have that det(E¯22) 6= 0 and
there exists a unique y∗2 such that E¯22y
∗
2 = −E¯211. Let s =
y2 − y∗2 . Then we obtain
s˙ = 0.5(I − diag(s+ y∗2))E¯22s. (7)
where s ∈ [−1− y∗2 , 1− ε− y∗2 ]|Ia,+|. Assume that
V (s) = −
N¯∑
i=1
γ¯i+|Ia,0| [2si + 2(1− y∗2i) ln(1− y∗2i − si)] ,
(8)
where N¯ = N − |Ia,0|, Γ¯ = diag{γ¯1, · · · , γ¯N} =
PΓPT. Let Γ¯1 = diag{γ¯1, · · · , γ¯|Ia,0|} and Γ¯2 =
diag{γ¯|Ia,0|+1, · · · , γ¯N}. It is easy to see from (8) that V (s)
is continuously differentiable in [−1 − y∗2 , 1 − ε − y∗2 ]|Ia,+|.
The time derivative of V (s) along (7) is calculated as follows:
V˙ =
N−|Ia,0|∑
i=1
2γ¯i+|Ia,0|
sis˙i
1− y∗2i − si
=
N−|Ia,0|∑
i=1
siγ¯i+|Ia,0|e¯22is
= sTH(Γ¯2E¯22)s,
where e¯22i is the ith row of matrix E¯22. Since H(ΓE)  0
and H(Γ¯2E¯22) is a principal submatrix of H(ΓE), we have
H(Γ¯2E¯22)  0. Hence,
V˙ =
N−|Ia,0|∑
i=1
siγ¯i+|Ia,0|e¯22is
= sTH(Γ¯2E¯22)s
≤ 0
for all s ∈ [−1− y∗2 , 1− ε− y∗2 ]|Ia,+|.
Thus, [−1−y∗2 , 1− ε−y∗2 ]|Ia,+| is positively invariant with
respect to (7). By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution of
(7) with initial condition s(0) ∈ [−1 − y∗2 , 1 − ε − y∗2 ]|Ia,+|
converges to y∗2 . When ε→ 0+, we have 1− ε→ 1−. Hence,
if x(0) ∈ {x | xi = 1, i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈ [−1, 1),∀i /∈ Ia,0}, then
lim
t→∞x(t) = x
∗.
3) Let S0(ε) = {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ [−1, 1− ε],∀i /∈
J }, where 0 < ε < 2, J = {j | vrj = ||vr||∞}. There exists
a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) takes the
following form
y˙ =
[
0 0
0 0.5(I − diag(y2))
] [
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
] [
y1
y2
]
,
where
y = Px =
[
y1
y2
]
with y1 = 1,dim y1 = |J |. Then we can get
y˙2 = 0.5(I − diag(y2))
(
E¯22y2 + E¯211
)
. (9)
Because σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N ,
vr 6= 1 and J = {j | vrj = ||vr||∞}, there exists a unique
solution y∗2 such that E¯22y
∗
2 + E¯211 = 0. From a geometric
point of view, the point
x∗ = PT
[
1
y∗2
]
is the intersection point of the line αvr with [−1, 1]N . Similar
to the arguments presented in 2), we can obtain that every
solution starting in S0(ε) approaches x∗ = βvr, where β =
1
||vr||∞ . When ε→ 0+, we can get that every solution starting
in {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ [−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } tends to βvr.
Second, we consider the case that Assumption 2 holds.
Because C = B + D is eventually positive, by Lemma 2,
matrix C is irreducible, ρ(C) is a simple positive eigenvalue
of C and the corresponding right eigenvector vr is positive.
Hence, E = C − dI has the eigenvalue ρ(C) − d with an
eigenvector vr. If d = ρ(C), then all eigenvalues of E have
non-positive real parts, and 0 is a simple eigenvalue of E
with a right positive eigenvector vr. If d > ρ(C), then all
eigenvalues of E have negative real parts, and its dominant
eigenvalue has the right positive eigenvector vr.
On this basis, one can use the similar methods presented
above to acquire the results in 1), 2) and 3) in the case of
Assumption 2, and details are omitted here for brevity. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2)
holds and the signed graph G(B) is undirected.
51) If x(0) < 1, then lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr, where vr is the right
positive eigenvector of B (C), α ∈ [− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ).
2) If Ia,0 6= ∅, Ia,+ 6= ∅, there exists a permutation matrix
P such that the network (2) has the form of (4), E¯22 is
nonsingular, and −1 ≤ −E¯−122 E¯211 < 1, then limt→∞x(t) =
x∗ for all x(0) ∈ {x | xi = 1, i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈ [−1, 1),∀i /∈
Ia,0}, where x∗ = PTy∗, and y∗ is the equilibrium points
of (4).
3) If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1,
then every solution starting in {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈
[−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches βvr, where J = {j | vrj =
||vr||∞}, β = 1||vr||∞ .
Proof: Because the signed graph G(B) is undirected, it
can be known that matrix E is symmetric and diagonalizable.
By Remark 3 given in Subsection III-B, we have H(E)  0
and rankH(E) = rankE. Hence, it follows from Theorem 1
that 1), 2) and 3) of this corollary hold. This completes the
proof of Corollary 1.
The stubborn positives scenario describes the case that the
agents only at one end of the opinion spectrum are stubborn.
For this scenario, an example about two smartphone brands
was presented in [24]. The opinion values 1 and −1 mean an
aggressive marketing of the brand and a neutral marketing of
the brand, respectively. Opinion −1 may be changed by other
opinions, but opinion 1 is stubborn and cannot be influenced by
other opinions. The above Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show
that the states of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) are
convergent under different initial conditions.
B. Stubborn Neutrals Scenario
This subsection examines the dynamic behavior of the
generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn neutrals
scenario, that is, A(x) = diag(x)2.
Lemma 1: Consider the generalized opinion dynamics (2)
under the stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x)2. Then
x(t) has nonnegative derivatives.
Proof: Let xt(z) be the solution of the generalized
opinion dynamics (2) with initial condition z ∈ RN . Define
M(t) = Dxt(z), F (x) = diag(x)2Ex, where Dxt(z) is the
Jacobian matrix. Then M(t) satisfies the variational equation
M˙ = DF (x)M, M(0) = I,
where DF (x) is the Jacobian matrix. It is easy to get
DF (x) = diag(x)

η1 e12x1 · · · e1Nx1
e21x2 η2 · · · e2Nx2
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
eN1xN eN2xN · · · ηN
 ,
where ηi = eiixi + 2
∑N
j=1 eijxj , i = 1, 2, · · · , N . We can
obtain that M(t) = 0 when x = 0. Hence, M(t) ≥ 0, that is,
x(t) has nonnegative derivatives.
Theorem 2: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2)
holds, G(B) is the signed digraph, and there exists a positive
diagonal matrix Γ = diag{γ1, · · · , γN} such that H(ΓE)  0
and rankH(ΓE) = rankE. If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)),
∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then
(1,1)
(-1,-1) (1,-1)
(-1,1)
0
P+
S+
P-
S-
S+-
S+-
x1
x2
Fig. 2. Convergence behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) with
stubborn neutrals in two dimensions. The blue solid line is spanned by the
right positive eigenvector vr , and the green curves with arrows denote several
trajectories of the generalized opinion dynamics (2).
1) lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr when x(0) > 0, where vr is the right
positive eigenvector of B (C), α ∈ (0, 1||vr||∞ ];
2) lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr when x(0) < 0, where α ∈
[− 1||vr||∞ , 0);
3) lim
t→∞x(t) = 0 otherwise.
If σi = σj > ρ(B) (d > ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then
lim
t→∞x(t) = 0, ∀x(0) ∈ [−1, 1]
N .
Proof: First, we consider the case that Assumption 1
holds. The corresponding state space is partitioned as depicted
in Fig. 2.
When σi = σj = ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , and B is
eventually positive matrix, by Lemma 2, we have that matrix
B is irreducible, ρ(B) is a simple positive eigenvalue of B and
the corresponding right eigenvector vr is positive. In this case,
the equilibrium points are x∗ = αvr, α ∈
[− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ].
Specifically, if Ia,0 = ∅, then all equilibrium points satisfy
Ex = 0. Hence, the equilibrium points are x∗ = αvr. If
Ia,+ = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x∗ = 0. If Ia,0 6= ∅
and Ia,+ 6= ∅, then there exists a permutation matrix P such
that
E¯ = PEPT,
=
[
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
]
,
and all equilibrium points are x∗ = PTy∗, y∗1 = 0, E¯22y
∗
2 =
0. If E¯22 is nonsingular, then y∗2 = 0 and x
∗ = 0. Assume
that E¯22 is singular, and there exists a nonzero vector ξ such
that E¯22ξ = 0. Let x = [0T ξT]T. Since there exists a positive
diagonal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE)  0, and rankH(ΓE) =
rankE, H(ΓE) and E have the same null space. As P is a
permutation matrix, H(PΓEPT) and PEPT have the same
null space. Suppose that Γ¯ = diag{Γ¯1, Γ¯2} = PΓPT. Then
xTH(PΓEPT)x = ξTH(Γ¯2E¯22)ξ = 0. Thus, PEPTx = 0.
6Because x = [0T ξT]T, PEPTx = 0 if and only if ξ = 0.
This is a contradiction with the assumption that ξ is a nonzero
vector. Therefore, if Ia,0 6= ∅ and Ia,+ 6= ∅, then the
equilibrium points are x∗ = 0.
If σi = σj > ρ(B),∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then we can use the
same method to obtain that the equilibrium points are x∗ = 0.
1) If x(0) > 0, then there exists ε ∈ (0, 1) such that x(0) ∈
[ε, 1]N . Let
V (x) = 2
N∑
i=1
γi ln(1 + xi). (10)
So V (x) is continuously differentiable in S+ = [ε, 1]N . By
Lemma 1, x(t) has nonnegative derivatives, that is, x˙i ≥
0,∀i = 1, · · · , N . For all x ∈ S+, the time derivative of
V (x) along (2) is given by
V˙ = 2
N∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
1 + xi
≤ 2
N∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
2xi
= xTH(ΓE)x
≤ 0
for all x ∈ S+. Hence, S+ is positively invariant with respect
to (2). V˙ = 0 if and only if x ∈ P+ =
{
x
∣∣x = αvr, α ∈[
ε
||vr||∞ ,
1
||vr||∞
]}
. By LaSalle invariance principle, the solu-
tion of (2) with initial condition x(0) ∈ S+ converges into P+.
Hence, if x(0) > 0, then lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr, α ∈
(
0, 1||vr||∞
]
.
2) If x(0) < 0, then there exists ε ∈ (0, 1) such that x(0) ∈
[−1,−ε]N . Let
V (x) = 2
N∑
i=1
γi ln(ε− xi). (11)
So V (x) is continuously differentiable in S− = [−1,−ε]N .
Because x(t) has nonnegative derivatives according to
Lemma 1, the time derivative of V (x) along (2) is found to
be
V˙ = 2
N∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
xi − ε
≤ 2
N∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
2xi
= xTH(ΓE)x
≤ 0
for all x ∈ S−. Hence, S− is positively invariant with respect
to (2). V˙ = 0 if and only if x ∈ P− =
{
x
∣∣x = αvr, α ∈[ − 1||vr||∞ ,− ε||vr||∞ ]}. From LaSalle invariance principle, it
follows that the solution of (2) with initial condition x(0) < 0
converges into P−.
3) Let S± =
{
x
∣∣x ∈ [−1, 1]N , N∏
i=1
xi = 0
}⋃{
x
∣∣x ∈
[−1, 1]N ,∃i, j s.t. sgn(xixj) = −1
}
. By Lemma 1, x(t) has
nonnegative derivatives, that is, x˙i ≥ 0,∀i = 1, · · · , N . From
the generalized opinion dynamics (2) with A(x) = diag(x)2,
it can be seen that sgn(xi(t)) = sgn(xi(0)). For arbitrary
x(0) ∈ S± with x(0) 6= 0, without loss of generality, assume
that xi(0) > 0, i = 1, 2, · · · , l1, xi(0) = 0, i = l1 + 1, · · · , l2,
xi(0) < 0, i = l2 + 1, · · · , N , where 1 < l1 < l2 < N are
positive constants. Define
V (x) = 2
l2∑
i=1
γi ln(xi + 1) + 2
N∑
i=l2+1
γi ln(ε− xi), (12)
where x(t) is the solution of the generalized opinion dynamics
(2) with initial condition x(0), and ε is a sufficiently small
positive constant. Let S(ε) = {x | x ∈ [−1, 1]N , xi ∈
[−1,−ε], i = l2 + 1, · · · , N}. Then V (x) is continuously
differentiable in S±
⋂S(ε). The time derivative of V (x) along
(2) is given by
V˙ = 2
l1∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
1 + xi
+ 2
N∑
i=l2+1
γi
x˙i
xi − ε
≤ 2
l1∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
2xi
+ 2
N∑
i=1
γi
x˙i
2xi
= xTH(ΓE)x
for all x ∈ S±
⋂S(ε). Since xTH(ΓE)x = 0, x ∈ S± if and
only if x = 0, V˙ < 0 for all x ∈ S±
⋂S(ε). Hence, V (x)
is strictly monotonically decreasing on S±
⋂S(ε), and V (x)
has a minimum value at x¯ with x¯i = 0, i = 1, · · · , l2, x¯i =
−ε, i = l2+1, · · · , N . Moreover, V˙ (x¯) < 0. Thus, the solution
of (2) with initial condition x(0) converges to 0. For arbitrary
x(0) ∈ S± , lim
t→∞x(t) = 0.
If σi = σj > ρ(B),∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then H(E) ≺ 0,
and Ex = 0 if and only if x = 0. Hence, using the method
shown above, it is easy to obtain that lim
t→∞x(t) = 0,∀x(0) ∈
[−1, 1]N .
Second, we turn to the case that Assumption 2 holds. Since
E = C−dI , C = B+D is eventually positive, and d ≥ ρ(C),
with the above-presented similar method we arrive at that the
equilibrium points are x∗ = αvr, α ∈
[ − 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ].
Precisely, if Ia,0 = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x∗ =
αvr. If Ia,+ = ∅, then the equilibrium points are x∗ = 0. If
Ia,0 6= ∅ and Ia,+ 6= ∅, then all equilibrium points are x∗ =
0. Therefore, the results of this theorem under Assumption 2
can be derived by means of the method given above, but the
actual derivation is skipped here. The proof of Theorem 2 is
thus complete.
When the signed graph G(B) is undirected, we have that
matrix E is symmetric and diagonalizable. Then we can obtain
the following corollary from Theorem 2. Its proof is similar
to that of Corollary 1, so it is omitted here.
Corollary 2: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2)
holds and the signed graph G(B) is undirected. If σi = σj =
ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then
1) lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr when x(0) > 0, where vr is the right
positive eigenvector of B (C), α ∈ (0, 1||vr||∞ ];
2) lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr when x(0) < 0, where α ∈
[− 1||vr||∞ , 0);
3) lim
t→∞x(t) = 0 otherwise.
7If σi = σj > ρ(B) (d > ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , then
lim
t→∞x(t) = 0, ∀x(0) ∈ [−1, 1]
N .
The stubborn neutrals scenario represents the situation that
the neutral opinions cannot be altered, while the extreme
opinions may be easily affected by other opinions. Theorem 2
and Corollary 2 establish the convergence of the generalized
opinion dynamics (2) under different initial conditions for this
scenario.
C. Stubborn Extremists Scenario
This subsection concentrates on the dynamic behavior of
the generalized opinion dynamics (2) under the stubborn
extremists scenario, that is, A(x) = (I − diag(x)2).
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2)
holds, G(B) is the signed digraph, and there exists a positive
diagonal matrix Γ = diag{γ1, · · · , γN} such that H(ΓE)  0
and rankH(ΓE) = rankE.
1) If x(0) ∈ (−1, 1)N , then lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr, where vr
is the right positive eigenvector of B (C), and α ∈(− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ).
2) If Ia,0 6= ∅, Ia,+ 6= ∅, there exists a permutation
matrix P such that the network (2) has the form of (4),
E¯22 is nonsingular, and −1 < −E¯−122 E¯21y∗1 < 1, then
lim
t→∞x(t) = x
∗ for all x(0) ∈ {x | |xi| = 1, i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈
(−1, 1),∀i /∈ Ia,0}, where x∗ = PTy∗, and y∗ is the
equilibrium point of (4).
3) If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1,
then every solution starting in {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈
(−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches 1||vr||∞ vr, where J = {j |
vrj = ||vr||∞}.
4) If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1,
then every solution starting in {x | xi = −1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈
(−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches − 1||vr||∞ vr.
Proof: First, we consider the case under Assumption 1,
and the partition of the state space is shown in Fig. 3.
If Assumption 1 holds, then 0 is a simple eigenvalue of E
with a right positive eigenvector vr when σi = ρ(B),∀i =
1, · · · , N . When σi = σj > ρ(B),∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , all
eigenvalues of E have negative real parts, and its dominant
eigenvalue has the right positive eigenvector vr.
1) Let S(ε) = {x | −1+ε ≤ xi ≤ 1−ε}, where 0 < ε < 1.
Introduce
V (x) = −1
2
N∑
i=1
γi ln(1− x2i ). (13)
For x ∈ S(ε), V (x) is positive definite, and the time derivative
of V (x) along (13) is found to be
V˙ =
N∑
i=1
γixi
x˙i
1− x2i
= xTH(ΓE)x.
Since H(ΓE)  0, we have V˙ ≤ 0. Hence, S(ε) is positively
invariant with respect to (2). By Lemma 4, V˙ = 0 if and
only if H(ΓE)x = 0. Because rankH(ΓE) = rankE, V˙ =
0 if and only if Ex = 0. If σi = ρ(B),∀i = 1, · · · , N ,
then V˙ = 0 if and only if x ∈ P(ε) = {x ∣∣x = αvr, α ∈
BA
CD
A1 B1
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BA
CD
A1 B1
C1D1
1
1
1-1
0
1
x1
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S1(ε)
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Fig. 3. Convergence behavior of the generalized opinion dynamics (2) with
stubborn extremists in three dimensions. The blue solid line is spanned by
the right positive eigenvector vr , and the green curves with arrows denote
several trajectories of the generalized opinion dynamics (2).
[ − −1+ε||vr||∞ , 1−ε||vr||∞ ]}. If σi = σj > ρ(B),∀i, j = 1, · · · , N ,
then V˙ = 0 if and only if x = 0. By LaSalle invariance
principle, the solution of (2) with initial condition x(0) ∈ S(ε)
converges into P(ε). If x(0) is sufficiently close to 1 or −1,
then ε→ 0. Hence, for all x(0) ∈ (−1, 1)N , lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr,
where α ∈ (− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ).
2) Let SIa,0(ε) = {x | |xi| = 1,∀i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈ [ε− 1, 1−
ε],∀i /∈ Ia,0}, where 0 < ε < 1. When x(0) ∈ SIa,0(ε),
the solution of (2) satisfies |xi(t)| ≡ 1,∀i ∈ Ia,0. P is a
permutation matrix such that
y = Px =
[
y1
y2
]
,
where |y1i| = 1,dim y1 = |Ia,0|. Then the network (2)
becomes
y˙ =
[
0 0
0 (I − diag(y2)2)
] [
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
] [
y1
y2
]
.
Hence,
y˙2 = (I − diag(y2)2)
(
E¯22y2 + E¯21y
∗
1
)
, (14)
where y2 ∈ [ε− 1, 1− ε]|Ia,+|.
Since E¯22 is nonsingular, there exists a unique y∗2 such that
E¯22y
∗
2 = −E¯21y∗1 . Let s = y2 − y∗2 . Then we have
s˙ = (I − diag(s+ y∗2)2)E¯22s, (15)
where s ∈ [ε− 1− y∗2 , 1− ε− y∗2 ]|Ia,+|. Assume that
V (s) = −1
2
N¯∑
i=1
γ¯i+|Ia,0|
[
y∗2i ln
Φ1(si)
Φ2(si)
− ln Φ2(si)
]
, (16)
where N¯ = N − |Ia,0|, Φ1(si) = 1 + (si + y∗2i), Φ2(si) =
1−(si+y∗2i), and Γ¯ = diag{γ¯1, · · · , γ¯N} = PΓPT. Let Γ¯1 =
diag{γ¯1, · · · , γ¯|Ia,0|} and Γ¯2 = diag{γ¯|Ia,0|+1, · · · , γ¯N}. It is
easy to see from (16) that V (s) is continuously differentiable
8in [ε− 1− y∗2 , 1− ε− y∗2 ]|Ia,+|. The time derivative of V (s)
along (15) is calculated as follows
V˙ =
N−|Ia,0|∑
i=1
γ¯i+|Ia,0|
sis˙i
1− (si + y∗2i)2
=
N−|Ia,0|∑
i=1
siγ¯i+|Ia,0|e¯22is
= sTH(Γ¯2E¯22)s,
where e¯22i is the ith row of matrix E¯22. Since H(ΓE)  0
and H(Γ¯2E¯22) is a principal submatrix of H(ΓE), we have
H(Γ¯2E¯22)  0. Hence,
V˙ =
N−|Ia,0|∑
i=1
siγ¯i+|Ia,0|e¯22is
= sTH(Γ¯2E¯22)s
≤ 0
for all s ∈ [ε− 1− y∗2 , 1− ε− y∗2 ]|Ia,+|.
Thus, [ε−1−y∗2 , 1−ε−y∗2 ]|Ia,+| is positively invariant with
respect to (15). By LaSalle invariance principle, the solution
of (15) with initial condition s(0) ∈ [ε−1−y∗2 , 1−ε−y∗2 ]|Ia,+|
converges to y∗2 . When ε → 0+, it leads to 1 − ε → 1− and
ε − 1 → −1+. Hence, if x(0) ∈ {x | |xi| = 1, i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈
(−1, 1),∀i /∈ Ia,0}, then lim
t→∞x(t) = x
∗.
3) Let S1(ε) = {x | xj = 1,∀j ∈ J , xi ∈ [ε − 1, 1 −
ε],∀i /∈ J }, where 0 < ε < 1. For x ∈ S1(ε), there exists
a permutation matrix P such that the network (2) has the
following form
y˙ =
[
0 0
0 (I − diag(y2)2)
] [
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
] [
y1
y2
]
,
where
y = Px =
[
y1
y2
]
with y1 = 1,dim y1 = |J |. Then we can get
y˙2 = (I − diag(y2)2)
(
E¯22y2 + E¯211
)
. (17)
Because vr 6= 1 and J = {j | vrj = ||vr||∞}, there exists
a unique solution y∗2 such that E¯22y
∗
2 + E¯211 = 0. From a
geometric point of view, the point
x∗ = PT
[
1
y∗2
]
is the intersection point of the line αvr with (−1, 1]N . Similar
to the arguments presented in 2), we can obtain that every
solution starting in S1(ε) approaches x∗ = 1||vr||∞ vr. When
ε→ 0+, we can have that every solution starting in {x | xi =
1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ (−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches 1||vr||∞ vr.
4) Let S2(ε) = {x | xi = −1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ [ε − 1, 1 −
ε],∀i /∈ J }, where 0 < ε < 1. For x(0) ∈ S2(ε), xi ≡
−1,∀i ∈ J . There exists a permutation matrix P such that
the network (2) takes the following form
y˙ =
[
0 0
0 (I − diag(y2)2)
] [
E¯11 E¯12
E¯21 E¯22
] [
y1
y2
]
,
where
y = Px =
[
y1
y2
]
with y1 = −1,dim y1 = |J |. Hence,
y˙2 = (I − diag(y2)2)
(
E¯22y2 − E¯211
)
. (18)
Because σi = σj = ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1, there
exists a unique solution y∗2 such that E¯22y
∗
2−E¯211 = 0. From
a geometric viewpoint, the point
x∗ = PT
[ −1
y∗2
]
is the intersection point of the line αvr with [−1, 1)N . Similar
to 3), we can derive that every solution starting in {x | xi =
−1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ (−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches − 1||vr||∞ vr.
Second, we deal with the case that Assumption 2 holds.
Similar to Theorem 1, we can know that E = C − dI has the
eigenvalue ρ(C) − d with eigenvector vr. If d = ρ(C), then
all eigenvalues of E have non-positive real parts, and 0 is a
simple eigenvalue of E with a right positive eigenvector vr. If
d > ρ(C), then all eigenvalues of E have negative real parts,
and its dominant eigenvalue has a right positive eigenvector
vr.
Finally, we can adopt the similar methods presented above
to get 1), 2), 3) and 4) under Assumption 2, and we omit
details here. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
When the signed graph G(B) is undirected, the next corol-
lary is an immediate result from Theorem 3. The proof is
skipped here since it is similar to that of Corollary 1.
Corollary 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 (Assumption 2)
holds and the signed graph G(B) is undirected.
1) If x(0) ∈ (−1, 1)N , then lim
t→∞x(t) = αvr, where vr
is the right positive eigenvector of B (C), and α ∈(− 1||vr||∞ , 1||vr||∞ ).
2) If Ia,0 6= ∅, Ia,+ 6= ∅, there exists a permutation matrix
P such that the network (2) has the form of (4), E¯22 is
nonsingular, and −1 < −E¯−122 E¯211 < 1, then limt→∞x(t) =
x∗ for all x(0) ∈ {x | |xi| = 1, i ∈ Ia,0, xi ∈ (−1, 1),∀i /∈
Ia,0}, where x∗ = PTy∗, and y∗ is the equilibrium point
of (4).
3) If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1,
then every solution starting in {x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈
(−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches 1||vr||∞ vr, where J = {j |
vrj = ||vr||∞}.
4) If σi = σj = ρ(B) (d = ρ(C)), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , vr 6= 1,
then every solution starting in {x | xi = −1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈
(−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches − 1||vr||∞ vr.
The stubborn extremists scenario illustrates the circum-
stance that the extreme opinions cannot be persuaded by other
opinions, while the other opinions are readily changed. This
scenario is adequate when there exists two competitive extreme
opinions, such as two opposite political parties. In this scenario
it is demonstrated in Theorem 3 and Corollary 3 that the
generalized opinion dynamics (2) has the assured convergence
under different initial conditions.
9D. Further Discussion
In this subsection, we will discuss several important aspects
of the results derived in the preceding subsections.
Remark 1: For different state-dependent susceptibility, the
dynamical behaviors of the generalized opinion model (2) are
very different. It can be seen from the proofs of Theorem 1–
Theorem 3 that the number of equilibrium points is different
for different state-dependent susceptibility. Specifically, the
number of equilibrium points is smallest in the stubborn
neutrals scenario, while the number of equilibrium points
is biggest in the stubborn extremists scenario. As a result,
distinctive Lyapunov functions (compare (5), (8), (10), (11),
(12), (13), (16)) are constructed to effectively handle these
different scenarios with a view to proving the convergence of
the generalized opinion dynamics (2).
Remark 2: If for each x0 ∈ Rn, there exists T > 0 such
that x ∈ Rn+ or x ∈ Rn− ∀t ≥ T , then the system is said to
achieve an unanimous opinion. Our Theorem 1–Theorem 3
reveal that the network (2) achieves a unanimous opinion.
Moreover, although all agents achieve a unanimous opinion,
the degree of opinion for each agent is different when the right
positive eigenvector vr 6= 1.
Remark 3: In Theorem 1–Theorem 3, one may use the
condition “E is real orthogonally diagonalizable” to replace
the condition “H(ΓE)  0 and rankH(ΓE) = rankE.”
Because E is real orthogonally diagonalizable, there exists
a real orthogonal matrix U such that UEUT is a diagonal
matrix. By Lemma 5 and Lemma 6, we have that H(E)  0
and rankH(E) = rankE.
Remark 4: If the signed graph G(B) is undirected, then
matrix E is a real symmetric matrix and orthogonally diago-
nalizable. If the signed graph G(B) is directed and B is real
orthogonally diagonalizable, then matrix E is orthogonally
diagonalizable.
Remark 5: If matrix E is not symmetric, then it is not
easy to verify whether the matrix is real orthogonally diag-
onalizable. However, by using the Matlab LMI (linear matrix
inequality) toolbox, it is straightforward to find a positive diag-
onal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE)  0 and rankH(E) = rankE.
See Example 2 in next section for details.
Remark 6: For a special class of matrices, there exists a
positive diagonal matrix Γ such that H(ΓE)  0. If σi =
σj > ρ(B), ∀i, j = 1, · · · , N , and B ≥ 0, then E = B − Σ
is a nonsingular M-matrix. It is known from the property of
M-matrices [40] that there exists a positive diagonal matrix Γ
such that H(ΓE) ≺ 0. Moreover, rankH(E) = rankE.
Remark 7: Unlike the model in [38], our model requires
that all eigenvalues of matrix E have non-positive real parts.
If there exists an eigenvalue of E which has the positive real
part, then the evolution of one agent may approach infinity as
time goes to infinity. This will contradict the assumption in
the stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x)2. Moreover,
in practice, the opinion about a specific matter should be
measured as a finite number rather than infinity.
Remark 8: The major difference between our work and
[24] is that the work in this paper can deal with antagonistic
interactions in social networks. Moreover, the model in this
paper is more general than the one in [24]. For example,
all eigenvalues of matrix E may have negative real parts in
our model. However, when all interactions among agents are
cooperative, our results may be more conservative than those
in [24], especially in the case of directed graphs.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
This section will provide two examples to illustrate the
effectiveness of the theoretical results. The first example comes
from the real-world, that is, Zachary’s Karate Club [42], while
the second example is taken from [38].
Example 1: In [42], Zachary studied the relationships in a
karate club, and obtained some results about fission. The club
consists of 34 members. There are two important persons in
the club: one is the club president John A., and the other
is Mr. Hi who is a part-time karate instructor. There is an
conflict between John A., and Mr. Hi over the price of karate
lessons. As the instructor, Mr. Hi wishes to raise prices.
However, as the club’s chief administrator, John A. wishes to
stabilize prices. Assume that the viewpoint of John A. is 1, the
viewpoint of Mr. Hi is −1, and the viewpoint of other members
is included in [−1, 1]. In [24], the three scenarios were studied,
that is, stubborn positives scenario A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)),
stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x)2, and stubborn
extremists scenario A(x) = (I−diag(x)2). However, antago-
nistic interactions among 34 members are also likely, but were
not considered in [24]. In this example, we assume that there
exist three pairs of antagonistic interactions, that is, Members
1 and 2, Members 1 and 32, and Members 33 and 34. We
examine three different scenarios, that is, stubborn positives
scenario, stubborn neutrals scenario, and stubborn extremists
scenario.
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of each person’s viewpoint in
the stubborn positives scenario, and illustrates the results of
Theorem 1. It is clear from Fig. 4 that the evolution of
each person’s viewpoint achieves the same viewpoint with
different levels of the opinion. Fig. 5 depicts the evolution
of each person’s viewpoint in the stubborn neutrals scenario,
exemplifying the results of Theorem 2. When all persons’
initial viewpoints are the same as John A’s, that is, xi(0) > 0,
the evolution of each person’s viewpoint reaches the same
viewpoint as John A but at different levels of the opinion.
Furthermore, as an illustration of the results of Theorem 3,
Fig. 6 displays the evolution of each person’s viewpoint in the
stubborn extremists scenario. In particular, when there exist
i, j such that xi(0) = 1, xj(0) = −1, the evolutions of these
persons’ viewpoint are unable to attain the same opinion, as
seen from Fig. 6(d). Note that this phenomenon cannot be
deduced from Theorem 3, which is left for future research.
Example 2: Consider the opinion dynamics
x˙ = A(x)(−Σ +B)x, (19)
where B is the adjacency matrix of signed digraph G(B), and
B =
 0 1.7877 −0.6743−0.7678 0 0.7354
0.5878 0 0
 .
As pointed out in [38], B is not eventually nonnegative.
But one can choose D = diag{0.2688, 1.002, 1.3272} such
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Fig. 4. Stubborn positives scenario in Example 1: (a) Evolution of each
person’s viewpoint for all |xi(0)| < 1; (b) Evolution of each person’s
viewpoint under the condition that x33(0) = 1, |xi(0)| < 1,∀i 6= 33.
that C = B + D is eventually positive. The matrix C has
the spectral radius ρ(C) = 1.5817 and the corresponding
right positive eigenvector vc = [0.3350 0.5378 0.7737] with
||vc||∞ = 1. If we select Σ = 1.5817I −D, then
E =
 −1.3129 1.7877 −0.6743−0.7678 −0.5797 0.7354
0.5878 0 −0.2545
  0,
and 0 is a simple positive eigenvalue of E = −Σ+B with the
corresponding right positive eigenvector being vc. We can find
a positive diagonal matrix Γ = diag{4.2681, 8.1972, 11.5733}
such that H(ΓE)  0 and rankH(ΓE) = rankE. Fig. 7–
Fig. 9 plot the evolution curves of each agent under the
stubborn positives scenario A(x) = 0.5(I − diag(x)), the
stubborn neutrals scenario A(x) = diag(x)2, and the stubborn
extremists scenario A(x) = (I − diag(x)2), respectively. So
Fig. 7–Fig. 9 illustrate the results of Theorem 1–Theorem 3,
respectively.
It is interesting to note that system (19) exhibits some new
behaviors when compared with the following linear model
given in [38]:
x˙ = (−Σ +B)x. (20)
For example, as pointed out in [38, Example 2], the states
of (20) hold to the orthant pair R3−,+. However, when
A(x) = diag(x)2, the states of (19) hold to the orthant
R3+ for initial condition xi(0) > 0 and to the orthant R3−
for initial condition xi(0) < 0 (see Fig. 8). Moreover,
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Fig. 5. Stubborn neutrals scenario in Example 1: (a) Evolution of each
person’s viewpoint for all xi(0) > 0; (b) Evolution of each person’s viewpoint
under the condition that ∃i, j s.t. xi(0) > 0, xj(0) < 0.
when A(x) = (I − diag(x)2), every solution starting in
{x | xi = 1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ (−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches vc,
where J = {3} (see Fig. 9(b)). And every solution starting in
{x | xi = −1,∀i ∈ J , xi ∈ (−1, 1),∀i /∈ J } approaches −vc
(see Fig. 9(c)).
V. CONCLUSION
A generalized nonlinear opinion dynamics with state-
dependent susceptibility to persuasion and antagonistic in-
teractions has been introduced in this paper. The introduced
model has been comprehensively analyzed, particularly with
a thorough investigation into three specializations of state-
dependent susceptibility drawn from the existing literature.
The main theoretical analysis tools adopted have been Perron-
Frobenius property of eventually positive matrix and LaSalle
invariance principle. It has been shown that all agents of the
opinion network converge into the subspace spanned by the
positive eigenvector of an eventually positive matrix. Generally
speaking, all entries of the positive eigenvector are not the
same unless the eventually positive matrix is a Laplacian
matrix. Therefore, the obtained results can represent different
levels of an opinion, which is a common phenomenon in
social networks. Finally, in this paper, it has been assumed
that all eigenvalues of the system matrix are non-positive. An
interesting topic for future work will be to study the case that
there does not exist any restriction on eigenvalues of a network
matrix.
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Fig. 6. Stubborn extremists scenario in Example 1: (a) Evolution of each
person’s viewpoint for all |xi(0)| < 1; (b) Evolution of each person’s
viewpoint under the condition that x33(0) = 1, |xi(0)| < 1, ∀i 6= 33; (c)
Evolution of each person’s viewpoint under the condition that x33(0) =
−1, |xi(0)| < 1, ∀i 6= 33; (d) Evolution of each person’s viewpoint under
the condition that ∃i, j s.t. xi(0) = 1, xj(0) = −1.
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Fig. 7. Stubborn positives scenario in Example 2: (a) Evolution of agent
for all |xi(0)| < 1; (b) Evolution of each agent under the condition that
x3(0) = 1, |xi(0)| < 1,∀i 6= 3.
APPENDIX A
SIGNED GRAPHS
Let G = (V, E , B) denote a weighted directed signed graph
(signed digraph), where V = {1, 2, · · · , N} is the set of
all nodes, E ∈ V × V is the set of edges, and B is an
adjacency matrix which assigns real numbers to the edges.
Let G(B) denote a graph with adjacency matrix B. An edge
(i, j) ∈ E is directed from node i to node j. The entry
bij > 0 (or < 0) is the weight corresponding to the edge
(i, j). Define E+ = {(i, j) | bij > 0} and E− = {(i, j) |
bij < 0}. Then E = E+ ∪ E−. For signed digraph G(B), let
L = Cr−B denote the Laplacian matrix of G(B), where Cr =
diag
{ N∑
j=1
|b1j |, · · · ,
N∑
j=1
|bNj |
}
. There exists an undirected
graph G(Bu) with adjacency matrix Bu = (B + BT)/2, and
the corresponding Laplacian is Lu = (L+LT)/2 = Cr−Bu.
Define Cc = diag
{ N∑
i=1
|bi1|, · · · ,
N∑
i=1
|biN |
}
. It is obvious that
Cr = Cc when BT = B. A signed digraph G(B) is said to
be weight balanced if Cr = Cc.
A directed path (length l−1) is a sequence of directed edges
of the form (i1, i2), (i2, i3), · · · , (il1, il) with distinct nodes.
A signed digraph has a spanning tree if there is a root node,
which has directed paths to all other nodes. A signed digraph
is said to be strongly connected if there is a directed path
between any two distinct nodes. G(B) is strongly connected
if and only if B is irreducible.
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Fig. 8. Stubborn neutrals scenario in Example 2: (a) Evolution of each agent
for all xi(0) > 0; (b) Evolution of each agent under the condition that
∃i, j s.t. xi(0) > 0, xj(0) < 0.
APPENDIX B
EVENTUALLY POSITIVE MATRICES AND
PERRONFROBENIUS PROPERTY
Definition 1: A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is said to possess Perron-
Frobenius property if ρ(A) is a positive eigenvalue of A and
the corresponding right eigenvector is nonnegative.
Definition 2: A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is said to possess the
strong Perron-Frobenius property if ρ(A) is a simple positive
eigenvalue of A and the corresponding right eigenvector is
positive.
Definition 3: A matrix A ∈ Rn×n is said to be eventually
positive (eventually nonnegative) if there exists a positive
integer k0 such that Ak > 0 (Ak ≥ 0),∀k ≥ k0.
The following lemma presents some connection between the
eventual positivity and strong Perron-Frobenius property.
Lemma 2 ( [39]): For a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, the following
statements are equivalent:
1) Both matrices A and AT possess the strong Perron-
Frobenius property.
2) A is an eventually positive matrix.
3) AT is an eventually positive matrix.
Lemma 3 ( [38]): Consider an eventually positive matrix
A, and denote a right eigenvector of A by vr > 0. Then any
eigenvector v1 of A with v1 > 0 must be a multiple of vr.
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Fig. 9. Stubborn extremists scenario in Example 2: (a) Evolution of each
agent for all |xi(0)| < 1; (b) Evolution of each agent under the condition
that x3(0) = 1, |xi(0)| < 1, ∀i 6= 3; (c) Evolution of each agent under the
condition that x3(0) = −1, |xi(0)| < 1, ∀i 6= 3; (d) Evolution of each agent
under the condition that ∃i, j s.t. xi(0) = 1, xj(0) = −1.
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APPENDIX C
SOME FACTS ABOUT SEMIDEFINITE MATRICES
Lemma 4 ( [43]): Let A ∈ Rn×n be negative semidefinite
and let x ∈ Rn. Then xTAx = 0 if and only if Ax = 0.
Lemma 5 ( [43]): Suppose that A ∈ Rn×n and H(A) =
1
2 (A+A
T) is negative semidefinite. Then
1) nullspaceA ⊂ nullspaceH(A); nullspaceAT ⊂
nullspaceH(A).
2) rankH(A) ≤ rankA.
3) The following statements are equivalent:
(i) A and H(A) have the same null space.
(ii) AT and H(A) have the same null space.
(iii) rankH(A) = rankA.
Lemma 6: Suppose that A ∈ Rn×n and H(A) = 12 (A+AT)
is negative semidefinite. If A is orthogonally diagonalizable,
then A and H(A) have the same null space, and AT and H(A)
have the same null space.
Proof: If A is orthogonally diagonalizable, then there
exists a real orthogonal matrix B such that BABT is a diag-
onal matrix. Meanwhile, AT is orthogonally diagonalizable,
and BATBT = [BABT]T. Hence, rankH(A) = rankA. By
Lemma 4, A and H(A) have the same null space, and AT
and H(A) have the same null space.
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